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BOOK REVIEW:
OVERDOSE:
HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION
Authored By: Richard A. Epstein*
Reviewed By. Merrill Goozner**
Law professor Richard Epstein begins his brief against government
regulation of the pharmaceutical industry with an important
observation: the pace of medical innovation has slowed dramatically in
recent years despite massive investment by government and industry in
basic and applied biomedical research. Life expectancy rose 21 years
between 1900 and 1950; over the next fifty years, it increased just nine
years more. "Medical science is not immune from the iron economic
law of diminishing marginal returns," he writes. "Sooner or later we
reach the point where an additional dollar of investment generates a
lower return than the previous dollar. More colloquially, it is always
easier to grab the low-hanging fruit than to reach the higher branches."'
He uses this iron law, unnoticed by a public and press obsessed
with the latest advances in medical technology, as his jumping off point
for the core argument of "Overdose: How Excessive Government
Regulation Stifles Pharmaceutical Innovation." If it is getting
progressively tougher to come up with cures for the age-old scourges of
mankind's old age and infirmities, then the last thing public officials,
consumer activists and the public should want is to throw additional
roadblocks in the way of those who seeking to move the ball on
medical progress. "Even if we cannot repeat the triumphs of an earlier
* Richard A. Epstein is a James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law,
Faculty Director of Curriculum, and Director, Law and Economics Program at the
University of Chicago Law School. Mr. Epstein has also been the Peter and Kirstin
Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution since 2000.
** Merrill Goozner spent more than twenty-five years as a foreign correspondent,
economics writer and investigative reporter for the Chicago Tribune and other
publications. Goozner left journalism in 2000 to teach journalism at New York
University. In 2003, Mr. Goozner joined the Center for Science in the Public Interest
as director of the Integrity in Science project where he continues his research and
writing.
1 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: How EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION
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age, we can still make substantial progress," he writes. "Take some
slowdown in overall progress as a given, and it is all the more
important to avoid any additional mistakes of policy that needlessly
retard the level of innovation.",
2
Yet that, in his view, is precisely what is threatening to take
place in the very near future because of the growing momentum for
pharmaceutical regulatory reform in Washington. The intellectual
property system that underpins private sector investment in the sector is
under siege. Price controls threaten to cut off the cash flow from older
innovations that finance the search for the new. Excessive safety
concerns on the part of the press and public have misaligned the risk-
benefit tradeoffs that must inevitably be taken into account by
regulators. Drug marketing is under assault by misguided critics rather
than being seen for what it is: a necessary adjunct to product diffusion
and, concomitantly, a boon to public health. And, finally, an out-of-
control tort system is imposing an unnecessary tax on the fully
anticipated adverse events that occasionally accompany the routine use
of useful products.
If this sounds like a brief prepared by an advocate for the
pharmaceutical industry, it should, because that it what it is. Epstein
discloses in his introduction that he has been a consultant for Pfizer Inc.
and many of the arguments have been prepared in the course of his
work for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association,
the industry's trade and lobbying group. So before I address some of
the issues raised by his book, allow me to make my own disclosure. I
am a paid employee for a non-profit group that advocates for some of
the changes that Epstein opposes. I have taken public positions in my
writings and talks that are diametrically opposed to his point of view. If
you're looking for a dispassionate overview of his book, I suggest you
look elsewhere.
To begin, a couple of general observations are in order. First,
Epstein's portrayal of the threats faced by the pharmaceutical industry
largely ignores the longer-term context that gave rise to recent efforts to
re-regulate the field. Over the past two decades, a succession of
changes in the laws and regulations that govern the Food and Drug
Administration have substantially liberalized the environment in which
new drug development takes place. Congress and the FDA have
reduced the time it takes to bring a new drug to market; 3 strengthened
2 Id. at 6.
3 Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491
(1992); Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
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and extended intellectual property protections; 4 sharply reduced its
oversight of drug industry direct-to-consumer marketing and
promotion; 5 expedited the approval of new drugs for life-threatening
conditions;6 and opened the door to the use of surrogate markers for
judging the medical efficacy of drugs and devices. 7 The net effect has
been to make the regulatory environment substantially more hospitable
for winning approval of new technologies.
Moreover, rather than becoming more safety conscious, the
FDA's system for protecting the public from unsafe drugs was recently
characterized by the prestigious Institute of Medicine as badly in need
of repair.
"As more drugs are being approved faster with less time to
intensively investigate premarketing safety data, FDA does
not have adequate resources or procedures for translating
preapproval safety signals into effective postmarketing
studies, for monitoring and ascertaining the safety of new
marketed drugs, for responding promptly to the safety
problems that are discovered after marketing approval, and
for quickly and effectively communicating appropriate risk
information to the public."
8
The IOM also lambasted the agency's leadership for promoting
an internal culture that was more interested in approving new drugs
than in carrying out its core mission - protecting the public from unsafe
and ineffective products. The IOM report was hardly a portrait of an
250, 116 Stat. 1588 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C
(2000)).
' Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) ((codified in various sections of titles 21, 35 & 42 U.S.C.
(2000)); Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983)
(codified as. amended at 21 U.S.C. § § 360aa-360ee (2000)); Best Pharmaceuticals
for Children Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002).
5 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA's OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
ADVERTISING (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0754.pdf.
6 See FDA's Subpart E Regulations, 21 C.F.R. § 312.80.(1988); FDA Subpart H
Regulations, 21 C.F.R. § 314.500 (1992); Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, §§ 112, 403(b)(3), 111 Stat. 2296,
2309, 2367 (1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 356, 371 (2000)).
7 FDA Subpart H Regulations, 21 C.F.R. § 314.500 (1992)
8 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND
PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 17 (Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2007).
2007]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
overbearing regulator. Economists have a phrase for describing the
current state of affairs at FDA: industry capture. Yet Epstein's book,
which rigorously applies economic logic in every sphere it addresses,
ignores this useful concept and the substantial evidence that it should
be applied to the FDA.9
Second, there is a general presumption suffusing the book that
physician prescribed medicines and procedures are the primary reasons
for America's improving life expectancy. People are leading longer and
healthier lives. Therefore, he argues, protecting industry's capacity for
innovation should trump other public health goals like protecting the
public from unsafe drugs or obtaining lower drug prices.
That certainly wasn't true in the first half of the 2 0 th century
when improved sanitation, clean water, warmer and better housing and
better diets resulted in that era's remarkable gains in life expectancy.
And it is only partially true for more recent decades, when increased
public awareness about the risks posed by inadequate or unhealthy diet,
smoking, and sedentary lifestyles contributed to more people leading
healthier lives. That, coupled with rising living standards, which is
closely related to better health outcomes, deserves the greatest share of
credit for more recent gains in life expectancy.
For example, despite the tens of billions of dollars poured into
the medical war on cancer over the past half century, the greatest gain
in that still unfinished struggle came from the public health campaign
against smoking, not the pharmacopoeia of new drugs we have to fight
the disease. Indeed, the importance of factors other than technological
innovation in determining population health led one of the nation's
leading demographers to project recently that rising obesity rates may
soon cause the century-long rise in longevity to come to an end despite
the health care system's technological brilliance. 10
Epstein did not set out to write a book about the trajectory of the
nation's health. But it is relevant, because only by ignoring these
factors do his arguments about, say, patent law or direct-to-consumer
advertising, gain significance. Each of his arguments against tougher
standards or increased regulation ultimately rests on the presumption
9 See HarrisInteractive.com, The FDA 's Reputation with the General Public Is Under
Assault, May 26, 2006,
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID= 1060 (This
Harris Interactive Poll in May 2006 found seven in ten adults did not believe the FDA
was doing a good job in protecting the public from unsafe drugs).
10 S. Jay Olshansky et al., A Potential Decline in Life Expectancy in the United States
in the 21s" Century, 352 NEW ENG J. MED 1138, 1138-45 (Mar. 2005).
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that creating new technologies that expand physician and consumer
choice in the marketplace - a marketplace that by his own admission is
delivering less and less innovation for society's marginal investment -
is the most efficient way to improve overall public health. There's not a
lot of evidence to back up that presumption.
But even on the limited terrain of medical innovation, the
evidence is weak that increased regulation will further retard its already
slowing advance. Indeed, if two decades of efforts to reduce regulation
and speed the review of new drugs and biologics could not prevent the
dramatic decline in significant new therapies emerging from industry
labs, isn't it logical to presume that a reversal of the deregulatory trend
in the name of increasing the safety of the nation's drug supply will
similarly have little impact on the overall trend?
I believe a strong argument can be made that re-regulating the
industry will have a positive impact on innovation, a view I will explain
briefly at the conclusion of this essay. But first to the task at hand,
which is a review of the issues that concern Epstein.
He begins with a critique of efforts to enact new limits on
public-private interactions because of concerns about conflicts of
interest. Epstein recognizes the value of the public sphere in generating
the basic scientific knowledge needed for biomedical innovation.
Without understanding the natural history of a disease, from its
biomolecular basis to its clinical manifestations, discovering a cure or a
palliative measure would be impossible. Virtually all of the research
needed to generate this understanding comes from non-industry
scientists supported by government grants, foundations and prizes,
which can be either financial or psychic.
But he fears that strict rules about conflicts of interest, which
arise when public sector or university scientists take money in the form
of grants, consulting contracts, speaking fees and other emoluments,
will choke off the smooth transition of this knowledge to the private
sector, which has the ultimate responsibility for bringing new
technology to market. He focuses on the recent scandal at the National
Institutes of Health, which adopted stricter rules governing the
agency's scientists' interactions with industry after a number of top
scientists failed to report their lucrative deals with private firms. 1 "The
' Reporter David Willman of the Los Angeles Times has doggedly pursued this story
over the past four years. See, e.g., David Willman, Stealth Merger: Drug Companies
and Government Medical Research, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at Al; David
Willman, NIH to Curb Its Scientists' Deals with Drug Firms, L.A. TIMES, June 23,
2004, at AI.
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NIH rules had created such a chill within the agency that individual
researchers were unwilling to answer emails about their research, to
provide advance papers for publication, or to work without
compensation (emphasis in the original) on any joint project - even on
projects for which the entrepreneur had received NIH development
licenses."' 2 The only problem he sees was inadequate disclosure of
those financial dealings, which proper supervision by NIH could have
easily resolved. Moreover, his fear now is that the ban on such dealings
at NIH will be extended to grantee institutions, which account for 80
percent of NIH research funds. "Scientific research would be crippled
in practice if the NIH chose to reverse field and expand the total ban it
now imposes on employees to its grantees and their employees. 13
Epstein leaves out half the story. He's absolutely right that there
was confusion and misapplication of NIH's new rules in the immediate
glare of the media's focus on the scandal (one scientist eventually
pleaded guilty, returned $300,000 in industry cash and was sentenced
to two months of community service for failing to disclose his
dealings). The confusion was fed by a grass roots effort by hundreds of
agency scientists to reverse the new guidelines. However, the rules
never prohibited government scientists from contacting or collaborating
with industry. They prohibited scientists from receiving cash for
exclusive dealings with private firms in the form of consulting
contracts, speaking honoraria, and pay for serving on advisory boards.
Those paid relationships have become standard operating procedure for
many university scientists who receive extramural NIH grants, and it's
hard to fault NIH scientists for being somewhat envious of their
academic colleagues. In some cases, those academicians don't even
have to divulge those dealings to their universities, which have a
scattershot approach to enforcing their own conflict-of-interest
guidelines. 14
But there's a solid rationale for prohibiting those dealings on
the part of NIH scientists. Over the years, the rigorous intellectual and
financial independence of the public sector has been one of the
wellsprings of medical innovation. Some of the most successful NIH
programs have been directed research campaigns where the
government seeks not only basic knowledge about a disease, but its
12 EPSTErN, supra note 1, at 32.
13 Id. at 34.
14 Elizabeth A. Boyd, Shira Liption & Lisa A. Bero, Implementation of Financial




cure. The development of the first AIDS drugs during the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the development of virtually all of the first cancer
chemotherapy drugs, and treatments for rare diseases like Gaucher's
disease are good examples. 15 Each was the product of dedicated
government scientists free to pursue whatever they considered the best
path in their single-minded pursuit of a cure.
The NIH officials involved with or in charge of those programs
often saw their roles as intellectual venture capitalists, sharing their
knowledge with anyone with a good idea. The exclusivity inherent in
private dealings would have only gotten in the way. Government
scientists with lucrative consulting contracts from private firms may be
less willing to cut their losses when a particular approach to a problem
proves unworkable. Or they may be less forthcoming or simply less
available to promising researchers in academia who have no money to
offer.
This silo mentality in basic and early applied research has been
the subject of much debate in the field of patenting, which Epstein
addresses in his next section. He dismisses concerns, raised by Rebecca
Eisenberg of the University of Michigan law school and others, 16 that
excessive patenting of early stage research can create an intellectual
property anticommons that chokes off scientific collaboration. He
offers as contrary evidence an empirical survey of scientists who claim
that it hasn't bothered them.'
7
Admittedly, the evidence that it has, such as the recent dust-ups
in the emerging embryonic stem cell field over the seminal James
Thompson patent marketed by the Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation, is anecdotal.1 8 But, then again, so is every successful new
drug and biologic. How does one count the decisions of researchers to
avoid fields entirely because someone else has already locked up key
inventions?
On the downstream side of research, Epstein believes
competition has offset the monopoly pricing power conferred by the
patents required by the private sector before it will invest in the applied
research and clinical trials needed to bring a new drug to market.
'5 MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800 MILLION PILL (2004).
16 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, SCIENCE, May 1, 1998, at
698-701.
17 EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 52.
18 Merrill Goozner, Innovation in Biomedicine: Can Stem Cell Research Lead the
Way to Affordability? 3 PLOS MEDICINE e 126 (Feb. 2006).
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Supply side competition comes in the form of me-too drug
development. Demand-side competition comes from the presence of
"serious players" like physicians, insurers and pharmacy benefit
managers who can counteract monopoly power through their
prescribing and formulary decisions. He offers as his example
AstraZeneca's Nexium, an antiacid that replaced Prilosec after it lost
patent exclusivity.' 
9
It's a curious choice. The two drugs are chemically similar.
Nexium, for those not familiar with organic chemistry, is one of the
enantiomers contained in Prilosec, which is a mixture of two mirror-
image molecules. In other words, when you take Prilosec, you are
already taking Nexium. I don't quarrel with the company's right to
patent Nexium and sell it as a separate drug. In some cases, separating
out an enantiomer of a useful drug can improve its performance by
eliminating the half of a mixture that generates an unwanted side effect.
But in this case, both halves are 90 percent effective and have similar
side effect profiles. How AstraZeneca was able to rack up $3 billion a
year in sales of Nexium after Prilosec became available over-the-
counter at a fraction of the cost is a textbook example of market failure,
where marketing triumphed over science, the market's pricing signals
and the alleged countervailing power of the other players in the market.
But rather than rein in marketing, Epstein would expand it. He
defends the industry's large marketing costs by pointing out that they
do not exceed other marketing-driven firms like Procter & Gamble and
Coca-Cola. By increasing the number of patients taking the drugs, he
argues, it improves public health. And by expanding the market, it
draws more R&D investment to medicine. He is dismissive of rules that
limit drug marketing to the narrow assessments contained on FDA
labels. "The social loss of an excessively dour projection of risks and
benefits is that people shy away from risky drugs that provide them
with expected net benefits."
20
Moreover, efforts to limit access to physicians by eliminating
gifts or excluding physicians with drug company ties fiom making
hospital formulary decisions risks introducing an opposite form of bias:
"a strong hostility to new products and the companies that supply
them.,2 1 Direct-to-consumer advertising, as long as it is accurate,
increases social welfare by building popular awareness of untreated
19 EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 63.2 1Id. at 155.
21 Id. at 160.
[Vol. 10.4523
OVERDOSE
conditions, so concerns about its costs are outweighed by its benefits.
And while he admits it may in some cases lead to patient pressure for
inappropriate medicines, physicians are well-positioned to block such
"ill-considered requests."
Not really. Industry influence over physician behavior goes
much deeper than the individual physician and consumer outreach
efforts by drug firm marketing departments. Those are mere
reinforcement mechanisms. The prime driver of choices made by
practicing physicians in the field is clinical practice guidelines, which
are mostly written by academic physicians with financial ties to
industry. Drug firms also play a major role in underwriting the
activities of professional societies, specialty annual meetings, and
doctors' continuing medical education, where most physician learning
takes place. 22 The medical literature itself has been skewed by
industry's growing dominance in clinical trial research. Industry
support of this crucial activity has gone from a one-third to two-thirds
of all funding in the past quarter century. And, as has been well
described elsewhere in the medical literature, studies financed by
industry are more likely to come up with findings that favor their
sponsors' products than comparable non-industry funded studies.
23
Epstein's view that the medical profession and its supportive
institutions are well-positioned to make independent judgments about
the value of new or old medicines is simply unsupported by the
evidence. Indeed, it is fair to say that accurate and objective
information about medicine is a scarce commodity, which has made it
difficult for participants in the health care marketplace to make well-
informed decisions. But don't take my word for it. Gail Wilensky, a
senior fellow at Project Hope and former administrator of the Health
Care Finance Administration (now the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services) in the George H.W. Bush administration, recently
joined in the call for a new multi-billion dollar agency to generate
information comparing the relative effectiveness of various medical
interventions, a public good that the private market has failed to
provide.
22 JEROME P. KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE: How MEDICINE'S COMPLICITY WITH BIG
BusINESS CAN ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH (2004).
23 Justin E. Belman, Yan Li, & Cary P. Gross, Scope and Impact of Financial
Con/jicts of Interest in Biomedical Research. A Systematic Review 289 JAMA 454,
454-65 (Jan. 2003).
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Moreover, she is very concerned about conflicts of interest
among those asked to generate this evidence. "There is widespread
agreement on the attributes that need to be associated with a
comparative effectiveness center: objectivity in the selection of what is
studied, credibility in the findings, and independence-from political
pressures generated either by government or by private-sector
stakeholders.
' 24
There is one argument in Epstein's book to which I am
somewhat sympathetic. His review of the legal landscape surrounding
pharmaceutical product liability suits concludes that "no legal system
can afford to try complex matters before a jury even one time, let alone
ten thousand times." 25 But is the answer to restrict access to the
courtroom, which his proposals would entail? Or does it make more
sense to create a regulatory and marketing environment that minimizes
the chances that a product with known harms will reach millions of
people in the first place?
In his relatively brief section on the FDA (just 30 pages in a
240-page book about excessive government regulation), Epstein pushes
in the opposition direction. After lamenting the steady expansion of
FDA power represented by the 1938 and 1962 amendments to the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which ushered in the safety and efficacy
requirements, respectively, he goes on to say that the safety
requirement in the current law "is too stringent for its own good.",26 He
would reduce the agency's ability to impose black box warnings
(heightened alerts for physicians) in favor of the cacophony of the
information marketplace where the opinions of the FDA, the drug
companies, safety advocates like Public Citizen and physician groups
can contend. As far as efficacy is concerned, "the standard should mean
that so long as some significant fraction of the population can benefit
on net from the use of the drug, it should continue to be sold.",
27
Epstein repeatedly returns to the variability of individual
response to drugs as his rationale for restricting the FDA's powers. If I
understand him properly, he would prefer to see a regulatory regime
where free men can take their own medicine any way they wish,
adequately warned about the known risks, of course. What this
paradigm ignores is any notion of population health, and the well-
24 Gail R. Wilensky, Developing a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Information,
25 HEALTH AFFAIRS w572, w572-w585 (2006).
25 EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 231.




established principle that the government has an important role to play
in protecting it through public health measures.
Much of the public debate in recent years - from the IOM
report to Congressional efforts to tighten drug regulations for the first
time in a generation - was triggered by the uproar over Vioxx, Merck's
ill-fated Cox-2 inhibitor. Epstein, after a selective reading and review
of the medical literature, concludes "that Vioxx should still be the drug
of choice for individuals with high intestinal risks and low cardiac
risks.",2
8
But who are they? Forget for a moment that the reduced
gastrointestinal (GI) side effect benefit from Cox-2s has never been
proven to the FDA's satisfaction: Vioxx, Celebrex and Bextra all
carried the same GI warnings as all other non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs. Forget for a moment that the GI risks are almost
all non-life threatening, while the cardiovascular risks took patients
lives. Forget for a moment that no company has ever run a clinical trial
testing the claim that some people benefit from this drug but not the
others in this or other classes, which is the only medical justification for
using Vioxx in the first place. And forget for a moment that Vioxx was
mass marketed to millions of people indiscriminately, despite suspected
cardiovascular risks that were the subject of a feverish outcry in the
medical literature.
29
How could a physician determine which patients met Epstein's
limited profile? There is currently no scientific method of determining
who might benefit and who might be at risk when taking this drug. That
doesn't mean that some day there might not be. The sequencing of the
human genome, the planned mapping of cancer tumor genomes, and
the cataloguing of human genetic variations are early milestones in the
coming era of personalized medicine. Should this scientific endeavor
succeed, scientists and physicians will be able to look at an individual's
genetic profile (or the genetic make-up of their cancer) and know what
drug to prescribe. However, that could have a largely negative
consequence on the pharmaceutical industry's current business model,
which is based on selling one-size-fits-all drugs to mass populations.
Epstein would use the promise of this emerging science to beat
back any increase in federal oversight that results from contemporary
safety concerns. That misinterprets the promise of these new
2 Id. at 216-18.
29 Debabrata Mukherjee, Steven E. Nissen, & Eric J. Topol, Risk of Cardiovascular
Events Associated with Selective COX-2 Inhibitors, 286 JAMA 954, 954-59 (Aug.
2001).
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technologies. One of the major tasks confronting the FDA today is
developing in-house scientific expertise and writing new rules for using
this technology to determine who should be taking which drugs in the
existing armamentarium. This evolving science will also point industry
down a scientific pathway for developing the innovative medicines that
will be safer and more effective than ones now on the market.
The FDA evolved because the American people decided that
science, not the market, should determine the value of new medicines.
In that sense, Epstein's deregulatory agenda represents a complete
misreading of history. Every major FDA reform (1938 and 1962) was
enacted after drug safety scandals, and each helped the drug industry
evolve to the next stage of its scientific development. We're at a
similar moment in time. Embracing the prescriptions in this book will
only postpone the industry's rejuvenation.
30 PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA'S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION (2003).
[Vol. 10.4:523
